FINAL REPORT OF THE USER SURVEY WORKING GROUP

25X1

30 June 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PREFACE

The Working Group on the User Survey (referred to in this paper as the Working Group) submits this report to the Intelligence Producers Council (IPC). It culminates 18 months of effort to determine how well the Intelligence Community served key policy-level consumers incumbent in 1980. The Working Group undertook this project under the aegis of the Interagency Working Group on Intelligence Production (IWGIP), a predecessor to the IPC. Representatives from CIA, DIA, NSA, and the Intelligence Community Staff collectively formulated the policies and parameters for this survey and the IWGIP reviewed and approved them at each stage of the project. Five core members of the Working Group,   25X1
                                                                                              25X1
                        collated the data and prepared this report. They are   25X1
solely responsible for the judgments and recommendations contained herein.

When considering the User Survey, in general, and the recommendations, in particular, the reader should note that the data were collected from June to December 1981 and covered a timeframe that spanned the latter years of the Carter Administration. Since the Working Group began the User Survey, some intelligence producers have made significant attempts to improve the producer/consumer relationship. Many of these changes were directly related to the survey itself, either as the result of preliminary findings or because they were initiated by Working Group members in the performance of their primary duties. Thus, some of the generic recommendations in Part IV of this report may have been partially anticipated by individual intelligence managers.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

I. KEY JUDGMENTS

The User Survey is the first Intelligence Community investigation of how senior policymakers value and use intelligence products. The Survey queried 154 senior officials that served in the Carter Administration, 133 of whom returned the questionnaire and completed the essay responses. Subsequently, 36 were interviewed by members of the User Survey Working Group.

The major findings of the survey, based on analysis of data from the questionnaires, essays, and interviews, show:

--Senior policymakers tended to know relatively little about intelligence or the intelligence process and relied on staffs or internal intelligence offices to obtain and present the products they needed.

--Systems developed by intelligence managers to determine policymakers' needs did not always work well and sometimes prevented policymakers from articulating their requirements. Delivery systems sometimes created delays in providing intelligence products to policymakers on a timely basis.

--Senior policymakers at State, Defense and the NSC were regular users of intelligence and were often influenced by it, but in other agencies, intelligence products were not as well received or read.

--Policymakers valued current intelligence but were often critical of analytic and estimative products or intelligence directly related to policy issues.

--Policymakers were generally satisfied with the quantity of materials they receive, but they complained that some products were not relevant, not timely, and therefore, not useful.

--The producer-consumer relationship had a direct bearing on the extent to which policymakers were satisfied with intelligence. Policy officials often preferred to deal directly with analysts or experts, but they indicated that the initiative in establishing relations was up to producers.

The User Survey Working Group collated recommendations from respondents and from its own data. To correct the problems surfaced in the survey, it recommends that intelligence managers:

--Develop a program to educate policymakers about intelligence.

--Replace the NITs with a more flexible and responsive tasking arrangement and clarify the role of the NIO/DIO/NSIO.

--Improve distribution and delivery systems.

Intelligence producers should improve the quality and utility of products by:

--Developing terms of reference for analysis in consultation with policymakers.

--Eliminating levels of review that fail to enhance the product.

--Improving presentation of precis, key judgments and summaries for the most senior officials.

--Determining if self-initiated products are meeting the needs of consumers.

Because the producer-consumer relationship is so critical, intelligence managers should:

--Insure direct contact between analysts, supervisors and managers with key consumers.

Finally, the Working Group recommends that periodic Community surveys be undertaken to determine:

--If the requirements for intelligence and uses of intelligence by policymakers have changed over time.

--If specific changes made in intelligence systems have produced the desired effects.

II. BACKGROUND

There have been several attempts in the past ten years to survey intelligence consumers on how well they were served by the Intelligence Community or its product. These attempts, unfortunately, did not have much impact on either the intelligence producers or their consumers. In late 1980, members of the Resource Management Staff (RMS) embarked on an effort to

survey key policymakers dealing with Third World issues. They
wished to interview as many outgoing members of the Carter
Administration as possible, devised a limited questionnaire, and
delivered it to about a dozen intelligence users.

In January 1981, it was apparent that the RMS project was a
major undertaking. The Director of RMS and the Director of the
National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) agreed to continue the
project under the aegis of the Interagency Working Group on
Intelligence Production.

In the ensuing months, the Working Group on the User Survey
formulated a project that went considerably beyond the original
RMS effort. The purpose of the project was to provide
intelligence production managers with consumer perceptions of the
value of the intelligence product. The plan was to survey
national policymakers using a broad questionnaire with a series
of related multiple choice and essay questions, followed by
personal interviews of selected respondents to the questionnaire.

The Working Group constructed the questionnaire with the
help of OMS psychologists, to insure that the responses would be
valid and suitable for analysis by appropriate software and
statistical procedures. The final questionnaire, which was
coordinated with many intelligence managers throughout the
producing community, contained multiple choice and essay
questions. The multiple-choice questions together with the
aggregate answers, are contained in Appendix A.

The selection criteria of the policymakers to be sampled
were relatively simple:

> --Policymakers had to be deputy assistant
> secretaries, equivalents, or above incumbent
> during the Carter Administration. (A list
> of participants is contained in Appendix B.)

> --They had to be national policymakers.

> --They had to be recipients of intelligence
> from more agencies than their own.

The Working Group selected 154 policymakers to survey, and
in June 1981, began hand-delivering the questionnaires
accompanied by a letter from the DCI requesting participation in
the project. By August, 133 responses had been returned.

The selection criteria for the personal interview phase of
the project was more complex. It entailed examination of the
multiple choice responses for anomalies, intelligence gaps, and
extremes of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Each completed
questionnaire was evaluated using a computer algorithm that
considered all this information in addition to the respondent's

III. **FINDINGS**

An analysis of the data obtained in this project enables us to cite a series of important findings. These major findings reveal some important lessons about the quality and utility of intelligence to national-level policymakers.

The Consumer

Senior policymakers--at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level and above--are the most important customers of national intelligence. This is the group on which the User Survey focused --consumers of finished intelligence. The User Survey also confirmed that senior officials in the national security decision-making system--the NSC Staff, State, and Defense--were the heaviest recipients of intelligence and generally the heaviest users. There was a second echelon of users at Treasury, Commerce, and Energy and a third level at peripheral agencies, who received a much smaller slice of intelligence and where use of intelligence is more limited. At all eschelons, these officials were not necessarily aware of the full range of intelligence support available to them or received by their offices since they often did not receive intelligence products directly. Instead they obtained their intelligence from:

--Their own staffs, who selected items for them or briefed the principals and often wrote reports based on a compilation of intelligence and other material. These staff officers were <u>not</u> normally intelligence officers.

--Some kind of intelligence liaison officer or briefing team, composed of intelligence professionals, who selected material based on a continuing dialogue about their needs and concerns.

--Slightly more than 50 percent of the respondents spent at least one half hour a day reviewing intelligence; almost 70 percent claimed that intelligence frequently influenced their policy decisions; and almost half believed that they could have benefitted from better intelligence in formulating policy.

What Consumers Know About Intelligence

Senior policy officials--including some who had had considerable experience in national security decision making-- consistently expressed a lack of knowledge about intelligence

agencies and functions. They also expressed a desire to know more about the system that served them. Many said they would have benefitted from a better introduction to intelligence when they first took office. Significantly only a very few took the initiative to find out more about intelligence on their own.

Specifically, policymakers said that they needed to know more about:

--How they could task the system to respond to specific questions as well as general judgments or assessments on larger issues.

--How to obtain material that already existed in the system and how to find out what was available.

--How to arrange for a dialogue with individual analysts or experts.

Consumers who were served by a departmental intelligence organization knew relatively little about other production in the Intelligence Community. They depend on the agency that served them directly to provide appropriate products from all sources. They assumed that this was being done and seldom took initiatives to seek additional intelligence on their own.

Policymakers did not always recognize intelligence or understand how much they were given. Because policymakers and their staffs try to integrate intelligence with other information they receive, the unique character of intelligence frequently becomes lost. Thus, policymakers often did not realize that intelligence material was included in the papers prepared by their staffs and they found it difficult to identify or separate intelligence from other materials. Perhaps the most extreme case was one senior official who thought he had received no intelligence of value--a problem aggravated by the extent to which his staff had filtered the substantial amount of intelligence actually delivered to his office.

Tasking and Delivery Systems

The User Survey sought to determine how policymakers made their needs known to intelligence producers and if they believed they were receiving what they had requested. This usually did not involve levying a specific request, but rather conveying a sufficient amount of information to intelligence producers so that they could make the right decisions about what to produce. There were problems in the production tasking mechanisms and in the delivery systems as well.

Some systems developed by intelligence managers to determine what policymakers need are not working as well as they might. Policymakers believe they have only limited ways of making their requirements known.

--Only 30 percent of senior policy officials in this study relied on the National Intelligence Officer system to levy requirements and obtain intelligence.

--An analysis of the data from DoD participants showed that the system that had been used by DIA to determine Defense Department reader requirements did not accurately reflect senior consumer needs and was not used by a large proportion of its consumers.

--Policymakers were not satisfied with the existing means of tasking intelligence collectors and producers.*

--Almost 70 percent of senior policy officials relied on their staff or intelligence liaison to task intelligence producers, and it appears that this system tended to "filter" requirements and create, in part, the disparity between what senior officials need and what intelligence analysts provided.

--The desire of policy officials to have better, more frequent and more direct access to analysts was one of the most consistent and strongly expressed observations made in the survey. Policymakers indicated that they desired the opportunity to have direct contact with expert analysts--as distinct from intelligence managers--both to obtain information and to explore various facets of a subject.

--Some policymakers reported that working through liaison groups was the most effective way to arrange briefings or dialogue with the working level analysts, and thus obtain the most relevant information.

---

*Even though no specific questions were asked regarding the National Intelligence Topics (NITs), it may be significant that in the essays and interviews, NITs were not cited as an effective means of making the intelligence needs of policymakers known to intelligence producers and collectors.

The combination of filters between policymaker and analyst, inefficiencies in established requirements mechanisms, and general ignorance about the inner workings of intelligence resulted in a system that made it difficult for policymakers to articulate their requirements in terms meaningful to intelligence producers. This system also inhibited producers' understanding of what products would be most relevant and useful.

There were mechanical problems in the intelligence delivery system. Intelligence officials at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level or higher rarely read intelligence products without an initial screening by a staff officer. Further, staffs generally sought to condense material for their often harried bosses. This screening system was even more restrictive for sensitive or codeword material. Such products required handling by special couriers, reading in special facilities, or storage in specially secured areas. Thus, sensitive or codeword reports often were not read or, if read, were not used.

Other problems uncovered in this area include:

--A reliance on liaison or staffs to obtain the appropriate material from existing stocks of intelligence products, but a realization that staffs, and sometimes liaison, were often unaware of what was already available.

--The lack of a feedback mechanism by which policymakers could tell intelligence producers what they thought about products. Policymakers often admitted they only had to pick up a telephone or write a note to provide such feedback, but seldom did.

--Problems with distribution lists, mail points and delivery systems within the consumer agencies themselves that sometimes mishandled, misaddressed, or misrouted intelligence.*

Policymakers used whatever systems were at hand to make their needs known and seldom tried to develop closer contact with intelligence producers. Where contacts had been established with NIOs or with producing components, these became institutionalized as the normal way of doing business. Policymakers often said that they would have liked a greater dialogue with the

---

*This information was not obtained from the consumers directly but was uncovered by the Working Group in tracking specific complaints of consumers in the essays and interviews.

Intelligence Community, but most failed to take the initiative. They assumed that existing delivery systems had to be accepted and used. In other words, they took whatever they got.

Evaluation of Intelligence

General Comments

A significant number of senior policymakers--indeed an overwhelming majority of senior recipients in State, Defense, and at the NSC Staff--read intelligence regularly and almost 70 percent said that intelligence frequently influenced them in policymaking. The other side of the coin, however, is also significant. Many senior officials outside State, Defense, and the NSC Staff, while regular recipients of intelligence products, were not regular readers of intelligence. Collectively they were much less influenced by intelligence in policymaking than consumers in State, Defense, and the NSC.

In their narrative comments, policymakers stressed the need for timeliness and relevance in intelligence, and their responses to the questionnaire showed that products like the NID, DIS, or State Morning Summary were highly valued.

Since policymakers are reactive or event-oriented, it is not surprising that national-level decisionmakers valued current intelligence more highly than other kinds of products.

Consumers were consistently critical of predictive intelligence--estimative intelligence in NIEs and other publications that tended to forecast events--or intelligence directly related to ongoing policy decisions.

There were several aspects of predictive/policy intelligence that were criticized by policymakers in the survey. Consumers said they found that such material was often produced too late to be useful, frequently did not relate to the actual policy questions under review, or often was coordinated--or "watered down"--to the point where the product was not as useful as it might have been if conflicting points of view had been stated explicitly.

Consumer perceptions of raw intelligence tended to polarize around two extremes, liking and using it frequently and disliking it and not using it at all.

> --Consumers received raw intelligence on a
> very timely basis, often at the same time as
> intelligence analysts. If consumers were
> under heavy time pressure--in the midst of a
> deepening crisis, for example--they were
> eager to obtain raw reporting and more
> willing to forego analysis from intelligence
> producers.

CONFIDENTIAL

--Raw intelligence was preferred by some
consumers who indicated that they were quite
capable of performing their own analysis.

--Many consumers who used raw intelligence
noted that the volume they received was
often excessive and that they had no way of
separating the few useful reports from the
large number they received.

Evaluation by Category

The User Survey was designed to provide some insights about
consumer views on the quantity and utility of intelligence in
various categories, geo-topical as well as functional. Because
the User Survey did not ask for a specific measure of
satisfaction from consumers, our conclusions about satisfaction
remain somewhat subjective. An empirical measure of "overall"
satisfaction, however, was derived from responses to a
combination of several survey items. This indicator of
satisfaction provided an index for determining how well consumers
thought they were being served by the Intelligence Community.

Consumer views on quantity of intelligence were the easiest
to obtain, although as noted earlier senior officials often were
not aware of the total amount of material received by their
staffs. Some consumers indicated that they received too much
intelligence, but the interview data revealed that this complaint
related primarily to raw reports. Policymakers seemed generally
satisfied with the amount of current intelligence and basic data
they received. Nevertheless, some 42% overall said that they did
not get enough material directly related to policy, and 35% said
specifically that they did not receive enough predictive or
analytical material.

Senior officials who had a broad range of topical and
geographic interests or responsibilities believed that coverage
of the Third World needed improvement, In contrast, those
officials who had specific responsibilities related to the Third
World were more satisfied with the amount of intelligence,
although they noted a particular deficiency in regard to
intelligence on Latin America. They blamed this shortfall impact
on the lack of human source intelligence in the area. Analysis
of the questionnaire revealed, however, that consumers were not
receiving a sufficient amount of scientific and technological
intelligence, largely because of distribution rather than
production problems.

Policymakers' comments about the quality of intelligence
were somewhat more difficult to pin down. Consumers were
satisfied with the Community's ability to digest and compress
large amounts of material in current publications and they were
impressed with the large volume of carefully organized data

presented in basic research work. However, consumers faulted the Community for the quality of its analysis. Criticism ranged from a lack of cogent, thoughtful judgment to an inability to assess reasonable alternative outcomes of events. Beyond this, the respondents could offer few ideas about how to improve the quality of analysis.

In the interviews, policymakers noted--in contrast to their criticisms of published material--that they were impressed with the expertise of intelligence analysts in those situations where they were able to deal with them directly. Thus, briefings and oral presentations got high marks in terms of quality, and policymakers were obviously impressed with the flexibility and depth of knowledge of Community analysts. An analysis of the data on the quality of intelligence by region yielded few surprises. Intelligence on the USSR, and Europe was rated high in quality; intelligence on the Third World ranked much lower. Similarly, the quality of military intelligence received high praise, while political and economic intelligence was not considered as high in quality.

The most important factors in regard to the utility of products related to relevance, timeliness and conciseness. Senior policy officials made it clear that they had only limited time to spend with intelligence, and that summaries, key judgment statements, or precis were extremely valuable. They also complained in interviews and in their narrative comments that papers that were too long, or did not relate to an issue of current concern were not useful. Because policymakers were "task-oriented"--that is, often caught up totally in the issue of the moment--the timing of intelligence support was critical. Intelligence products that arrived too early, or too late, were not used.

Current intelligence received the highest marks in terms of utility because it was concise, timely and related to "front burner" issues. Policymakers also commented favorably on event-monitoring intelligence from task force operations in covering fast breaking events, and alert memos that warned of imminent events with serious consequences for the US.

Basic intelligence--factual data, in-depth material and descriptive intelligence--is also considered to be of great utility even though it was used more by the staff than by the policymaker. Many consumers commented that there was a need for more factual data, particularly on the Third World. Some consumers were critical of biographic reporting, complaining that it was not useful because it was static and not sufficiently comprehensive or insightful. Nevertheless, intelligence ratings of utility by both region and topic ranged from "fairly useful" to "very useful" with few exceptions.

In the interviews, the Working Group tried to determine why policymakers gave their lowest marks for utility to

predictive, analytic and policy-related intelligence. The major cause of dissatisfaction was relevance. The responses indicated a discrepancy between the materials the Intelligence Community thought the policymakers needed, and the information the policymakers actually wanted.

Evaluation by Product

The User Survey defined the intelligence product to include both written intelligence materials of various kinds and oral intelligence, normally in the form of intelligence briefings. Nearly all senior policy officials who participated in the survey indicated that they usually received both oral and written intelligence and generally preferred a mix rather than reliance on only one form.

Clearly, the most widely used intelligence publications are those that contain current intelligence. A great majority--about 80 percent--of those who received the NID said they read it regularly; those who received the State Morning Summary also were steady readers of that publication. Where consumers received both, they expressed a preference for the State product because it was often more timely, more policy relevant and its articles had more depth. Defense Department policymakers were slightly less avid readers of DIA's current intelligence--69 percent of those receiving the DIS read it regularly--but were much heavier users of current intelligence briefings. Almost everyone at the NSC Staff who received the CIA and State current intelligence products read them regularly. Consumers outside State, Defense and the NSC Staff did not regularly receive or read current intelligence.

A second widely read--though often criticized--series of publications are those published by the National Intelligence Council--NIEs, SNIEs, IIMs, and Alert Memos. About 85 percent of the survey respondents said they received some or all of these products, and 67 percent claimed to have read them regularly. State, Defense, and the NSC Staff were heavy readers of the NIC publications; others read them less than half the time.

Other periodicals received mixed reviews and were of varying utility to consumers. The CIA's IEEW was received by about two-thirds of the survey respondents, and about half of those reported that they read it frequently; other CIA serials were read by less than half of those who received them.

Of the remaining publications--including memoranda, assessments and research papers--CIA's were the most widely circulated, but readership at senior levels outside State, Defense, and the NSC Staff--was limited. State Department publications were received and read with consistency in the Department and at the NSC, but DIA publications tended to be used mostly in DoD.

After discussing these patterns of use with the senior level policymakers we interviewed and after reviewing the comments contained in their narratives, The Working Group concluded that:

--Senior policy officials were satisfied with current intelligence support.

--Community products were less useful if policymakers thought they had been "watered down" in their coordination or if they failed to detail areas where the Community could not agree.

--More specialized publications or material containing more depth and detail were not widely used by senior officials directly, but rather were digested for them by their staffs.

The Producer-Consumer Relationship

There was no consistent pattern to the producer-consumer relationship, either by agency or by level of responsibility. The relationship between intelligence producers and consumers directly affected the consumers perception of intelligence support. Where policymakers had good relations with intelligence producers--especially with individual analysts or where they were directly supported by a professional intelligence liaison staff that facilitated bringing analysts and consumers together-- policymakers seemed to be able to make requirements known and obtain the intelligence they found useful.

Consumers expected intelligence producers to take the responsibility for establishing and maintaining the producer-consumer dialogue; policymakers often professed ignorance about how to do it themselves. If there is to be a dialogue, intelligence producers must not only establish it, but must keep it going. Policy officials were generally passive recipients of intelligence--along with an enormous amount of other information.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The User Survey addressed many aspects of the intelligence producer/policy consumer relationship. During the interviews, and in their essay responses, some respondents made specific recommendations to correct serious deficiencies they had identified in this relationship. The Working Group, in reviewing the data, developed a number of ideas of its own. The recommendations outlined here represent a collation of these ideas and are designed to stimulate discussion by intelligence managers. The recommendations are aimed at improving intelligence support to the national decision-making apparatus; an additional recommendation concerns the utility of further

surveys of this type. The bulk of these recommendations are directed toward individual intelligence managers. We recommend, moreover, the establishment of an inter-agency working group for addressing those problems that are conducive to centralized solutions.

The User Survey clearly indicates that the majority of consumers are very satisfied with the support provided by the Intelligence Community. Were the Community to do no more than maintain this relative level of performance it would more than justify its budget. There are, however, areas in which its contribution to the decisionmaking process could be improved substantially. To improve the Community's responsiveness would not be a costly undertaking, but it would require important changes in the way its production elements have grown accustomed to doing business.

The Survey suggests that the Community does best when it describes, and not nearly as well when it seeks to analyze and predict. This in effect was the message consumers were conveying in the high marks they gave to current, crisis monitoring, basic, and military intelligence, and the relatively low ratings accorded predictive/analytic intelligence directly related to policy issues.

Historically, intelligence managers have dealt with specific problems as they arose without seeking generic solutions. More comprehensive and perhaps daring approaches will be required if the Community wishes to play a greater role in the full spectrum of policy formulation.

The Working Group recommends that the Intelligence Community, as a whole, should take action on a variety of issues to better serve the consumer by:

> --Developing a program to educate senior
> policymakers and their staffs about
> intelligence, the intelligence process and
> the intelligence bureaucracy. This ought to
> be done as an administration takes office
> and then should be continued as personnel in
> key positions change.

> --Learning more about who actually uses the
> intelligence product and how products are
> handled in policy offices, especially
> outside the NSC/State/Defense cluster.

> --Assuring that policymakers are aware of
> existing Intelligence Community
> bibliographic systems for publications and
> documents and that they know how to use them

CONFIDENTIAL

to obtain material already in print or
retrieve intelligence publications--
especially sensitive items--when they are
needed.

Problems in tasking and delivery systems also figured
significantly in the Survey. The Working Group recommends:

--Replacing the NITs with a more flexible and
responsive system to articulate consumer
needs.

--Determining the appropriate division of
labor and responsibility between the
NIO/DIO/NSIO structure and the intelligence
production offices. The lines of authority
between these two entities are not at all
clear.

--Improving communication in the tasking
process. The present system has too many
"filters" that often serve to change the
nuance and priority of requests. Ideally,
analysts and consumers ought to be able to
discuss consumer requirements to insure that
the product is relevant and timely.

--Reviewing and overhauling distribution
systems to insure that customers receive the
appropriate publications, that delays in
mailrooms are kept to a minimum, and that
codeword or other sensitive material is
handled as expeditiously as possible.

The Working Group recommends that production managers also
undertake efforts to improve the quality and utility of the
intelligence product by:

--Improving the relevance of the analytic
product by developing terms of reference in
consultation with policy consumers, and by
insuring that in-depth analysis and research
actually meets the needs of policymakers.

--Taking action to insure that products arrive
on policymakers' desks when they can be
used.

--Eliminating levels of review that fail to
enhance the quality or utility of the
intelligence product.

Policymakers' comments about the utility and quantity of raw
intelligence suggest that individual producers should:

14
CONFIDENTIAL

--Insure that policy consumers receive a more
appropriate quantity of raw reporting suited
to their individuals needs, rather than a
"dump" of total incoming take.

The suggestions already made in regard to overhauling
distribution systems and reviewing production requirements will
also contribute to improving the quality and utility of the
product. In addition, however, the Working Group recommends that
production managers review the existing product mix to determine:

--If some better method of presenting precis,
key judgments, or summaries can be provided
on a regular basis to senior officials.

--If production initiated by the Intelligence
Community is meeting the needs of
policymakers.

Many of the issues uncovered in the User Survey derive
directly from problems in the relationship between producers and
consumers. The ultimate responsibility for this relationship
rests with production managers at all levels. The Working Group
believes that this relationship should be nurtured and
enhanced. This would insure that intelligence producers would
understand more readily the needs of consumers, and policymakers
would be able to make their needs known or provide feedback more
effectively. The Working Group, therefore, recommends that:

--Production managers ensure direct contact
between their analysts and key consumers.

--Production supervisors and managers should
be expected to establish and maintain
contacts with key policy officials at
appropriate levels.

--The establishment and maintenance of
consumer relations should be an integral
part of performance evaluations.

--The role of the NIO/DIO/NSIO be more
precisely defined.

Our final recommendation relates to the desirability and
utility of surveys of this kind. The Working Group recommends
that this survey be replicated within the next two years, and
periodically thereafter. This would serve at least two important
purposes:

--It would provide intelligence producers with
an empirical mechanism for gauging the
effects of changes made in the intelligence

CONFIDENTIAL

products and the tasking and delivery
systems.

--It would enable intelligence producing
- agencies to see how requirements for
intelligence and uses of intelligence
fluctuate over time.

Detailed comments about future surveys are contained at
Appendix C.

APPENDIX A

SURVEY ON INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER PRODUCTION

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices
1. How regularly did you use intelligence? (circle one)	132	82 13 5 0 0	a. Almost daily or daily b. About weekly c. About monthly d. Less often than monthly e. Never
2. How often did intelligence influence your policy decisions? (circle one)	133	15 53 26 7 0	a. Always b. Frequently c. Occasionally d. Rarely e. Never
3. How often did you formulate policy with the belief that you would have benefited from better intelligence? (circle one)	133	5 41 47 7 0	a. Always b. Frequently c. Occasionally d. Rarely e. Never
4. On the average, how much time did you devote daily to reviewing intelligence? (circle one)	133	14 38 42 5	a. More than one hour b. One-half hour to an hour c. More than five minutes but less than a half hour d. Five minutes or less
5. To what degree did you rely on your subordinates to screen the intelligence that you received? (circle one)	132	18 64 18	a. My subordinates screened all of the intelligence I received. b. My subordinates screened some of the intelligence I received. c. My subordinates screened none of the intelligence I received.
6. In what form did you ordinarily receive intelligence? (circle all that apply)	133 133 133 133 133 133	92 82 49 71 35 19	a. Formal intelligence publications b. Oral presentations by intelligence officers either from your own organization or an outside intelligence agency c. Oral presentations by subordinates other than intelligence officers d. Written presentations prepared for you by intelligence officers either from your own organization or an outside intelligence agency e. Written presentations prepared for you by subordinates other than intelligence officers f. Other (specify)

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices
7. In what form did you usually prefer to receive your intelligence? (circle one)	132	5 34 60 2	a. In oral form b. In written form c. In some combination of oral and written form d. Other (specify)
8. Listed below are five commonly used methods for seeking intelligence. Indicate how often you used each of the methods.			
a. Direct contact with Agency Directors or Deputy Directors	126	6 11 20 37 26	1. Almost daily or daily 2. About weekly 3. About monthly 4. Less often than monthly 5. Never
b. Direct contact with National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), Defense Intelligence Officers (DIOs), or Signals Intelligence National Intelligence Officers (SINIOs)	128	6 22 17 35 20	1. Almost daily or daily 2. About weekly 3. About monthly 4. Less often than monthly 5. Never
c. Direct contact with other intelligence officers	121	24 24 22 23 7	1. Almost daily or daily 2. About weekly 3. About monthly 4. Less often than monthly 5. Never
d. Through the Intelligence liaison office in your organization	124	40 29 12 11 9	1. Almost daily 2. About weekly 3. About monthly 4. Less often than monthly 5. Never
e. Through action (written or telephone) by your staff	119	29 32 19 13 8	1. Almost daily 2. About weekly 3. About monthly 4. Less often than monthly 5. Never
9. Indicate how often you levied requests for each of the following types of intelligence information?			
a. Basic factual data--for example, geographic, biographic, etc.	128	4 33 36 23 5	1. Almost daily or daily 2. About weekly 3. About monthly 4. Less often than monthly 5. Never
b. In-depth analytic studies of specific issues	129	2 15 35 44 5	1. Almost daily or daily 2. About weekly 3. About monthly 4. Less often than monthly 5. Never
c. Current reporting on topics of continuing interest	128	27 27 25 18 2	1. Almost daily or daily 2. About weekly 3. About monthly 4. Less often than monthly 5. Never

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices
d. Additional information on an issue that was covered in an intelligence publication	126	7 31 25 34 3	1. Almost daily or daily 2. About weekly 3. About monthly 4. Less often than monthly 5. Never
e. Other (specify)	14	14 7 14 36 29	1. Almost daily or daily 2. About weekly 3. About monthly 4. Less often than monthly 5. Never
10. Indicate how often you levied requests for intelligence on each of the following agencies.			
a. State Department	124	15 19 15 24 27	1. Almost daily or daily 2. About weekly 3. About monthly 4. Less often than monthly 5. Never
b. CIA	125	8 24 34 27 7	1. Almost daily 2. About weekly 3. About monthly 4. Less often than monthly 5. Never
c. DIA	123	7 19 18 28 29	1. Almost daily 2. About weekly 3. About monthly 4. Less often than monthly 5. Never
d. NSA	125	4 14 19 43 20	1. Almost daily 2. About weekly 3. About monthly 4. Less often than monthly 5. Never
e. Army, Navy, or Air Force Intelligence	120	5 6 12 30 48	1. Almost daily 2. About weekly 3. About monthly 4. Less often than monthly 5. Never
f. Other (specify)	19	5 21 21 11 42	1. Almost daily 2. About weekly 3. About monthly 4. Less often than monthly 5. Never
11. In general, how satisfied were you with the answers to your requests for intelligence (circle one)	131	2 72 24 0 2	a. I was totally satisfied. b. I was generally satisfied c. There was room for substantial improvement. d. I was completely dissatisfied. e. Not applicable

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices

12. In this questionnaire, raw intelligence is defined as direct reporting by intelligence collectors with no more than brief annotation or comment provided by Headquarters elements. Examples are attache cables, NSA reporting of individual items, CIA Information Reports, Defense Intelligence Reports (IRs), State cables, and FBIS reports. As an intelligence consumer, how often did you receive Raw Intelligence as a part of your input from the Intelligence Community? (circle one)

131

Percentage	Choices
60	1. Almost daily
16	2. About weekly
12	3. About monthly
9	4. Less often than monthly
3	5. Never

13. Listed below are publications of the major intelligence producing organizations and a six-point scale corresponding to how often you read any publication you received of the type listed. (Please enter a rating from 1 to 6 in the blank to the left of each publication.)

Intelligence Community Publications

a. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), Interagency Intelligence Memorandums (IIMs), Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs), or Alert Memorandums

124

Percentage	Choices
25	1. Always
36	2. Frequently
25	3. Occasionally
6	4. Rarely
0	5. Received but did not read
7	6. Did not receive

CIA Publications

b. National Intelligence Daily (NID)

124

Percentage	Choices
53	1. Always
18	2. Frequently
7	3. Occasionally
4	4. Rarely
2	5. Received but did not read
16	6. Did not receive

c. International Economic and Energy Weekly (IEEW)

123

Percentage	Choices
13	1. Always
24	2. Frequently
11	3. Occasionally
20	4. Rarely
4	5. Received but did not read
29	6. Did not receive

d. Other periodic reviews--for example, Africa Review, Latin America Review, Western Europe Review, Strategic Intelligence Monthly Review, Quarterly Report on the Health of Foreign VIPs, Science & Weapons Daily Review, etc..

126

Percentage	Choices
7	1. Always
21	2. Frequently
25	3. Occasionally
22	4. Rarely
2	5. Received but did not read
21	6. Did not receive

e. Intelligence Assessments, Memorandums, Research Papers

127

Percentage	Choices
16	1. Always
44	2. Frequently
29	3. Occasionally
9	4. Rarely
0	5. Received but did not read
2	6. Did not receive

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices
f. Other CIA reports (specify)	22	46	1. Always
		18	2. Frequently
		9	3. Occasionally
		5	4. Rarely
		0	5. Received but did not read
		23	6. Did not receive

DIA and Department of Defense Publications

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices
g. Defense Intelligence Summary (DIS)	125	13	1. Always
		19	2. Frequently
		15	3. Occasionally
		14	4. Rarely
		4	5. Received but did not read
		35	6. Did not receive
h. Defense Intelligence Notices, Appraisals, and Warning Reports	122	12	1. Always
		15	2. Frequently
		24	3. Occasionally
		12	4. Rarely
		2	5. Received but did not read
		35	6. Did not receive
i. DIA Analytic Report	119	2	1. Always
		12	2. Frequently
		15	3. Occasionally
		24	4. Rarely
		3	5. Received but did not read
		45	6. Did not receive
j. Scientific and Technical Reports (from FTD, FSTC, NISC, etc.)	123	4	1. Always
		7	2. Frequently
		24	3. Occasionally
		20	4. Rarely
		4	5. Received but did not read
		41	6. Did not receive
k. Other DIA or Defense reports (specify)	48	17	1. Always
		13	2. Frequently
		4	3. Occasionally
		10	4. Rarely
		4	5. Received but did not read
		52	6. Did not receive

Department of State Publications

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices
l. State Morning Summary	120	41	1. Always
		3	2. Frequently
		4	3. Occasionally
		7	4. Rarely
		0	5. Received but did not read
		45	6. Did not receive
m. INR Current Analysis Series and Situation Reports--for example, Arab/Israeli Sit. Rep., Soviet Highlights, etc.	120	18	1. Always
		21	2. Frequently
		18	3. Occasionally
		11	4. Rarely
		0	5. Received but did not read
		33	6. Did not receive

	Question	Respondents	Percentage		Choices
n.	INR Intelligence Reports--for example, Current Analyses, Assessments and Policy Assessments	121	15	1.	Always
			21	2.	Frequently
			24	3.	Occasionally
			15	4.	Rarely
			0	5.	Received but did not read
			26	6.	Did not receive
o.	INR Analyst Briefs	118	11	1.	Always
			14	2.	Frequently
			15	3.	Occasionally
			14	4.	Rarely
			0	5.	Received but did not read
			47	6.	Did not receive
p.	Other State reports (specify)	26	12	1.	Always
			12	2.	Frequently
			12	3.	Occasionally
			0	4.	Rarely
			0	5.	Received but did not read
			65	6.	Did not receive

NSA Publications

	Question	Respondents	Percentage		Choices
q.	NSA SIGINT Summary	116	16	1.	Always
			13	2.	Frequently
			17	3.	Occasionally
			10	4.	Rarely
			0	5.	Received but did not read
			45	6.	Did not receive
r.	Daily Area Event Summaries	112	8	1.	Always
			5	2.	Frequently
			13	3.	Occasionally
			11	4.	Rarely
			2	5.	Received but did not read
			62	6.	Did not receive
s.	Periodic Topical Summaries	113	5	1.	Always
			10	2.	Frequently
			20	3.	Occasionally
			12	4.	Rarely
			1	5.	Received but did not read
			51	6.	Did not receive
t.	Other NSA Reports (specify)	61	21	1.	Always
			10	2.	Frequently
			10	3.	Occasionally
			7	4.	Rarely
			0	5.	Received but did not read
			52	6.	Did not receive

14. Characterize the quantity of each of the following types of information that you received.

	Question	Respondents	Percentage		Choices
a.	Analyses and information originating outside the Intelligence Community--for example, newspapers, periodicals, academic research, etc.	126	19	1.	Excessive
			70	2.	Sufficient
			6	3.	Insufficient
			6	4.	Did not receive
b.	Raw intelligence reports	127	12	1.	Excessive
			68	2.	Sufficient
			11	3.	Insufficient
			9	4.	Did not receive

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices
c. Current intelligence--for example, reporting on daily developments in such periodicals as the NID, State Morning Summary, or DIA DIS	126	7 79 6 9	1. Excessive 2. Sufficient 3. Insufficient 4. Did not receive
d. Basic intelligence--for example, compilations of factual data, biographic information, etc.	127	5 78 14 3	1. Excessive 2. Sufficient 3. Insufficient 4. Did not receive
e. Predictive and analytic intelligence--for example, NIEs, Assessments, Memorandums, Research Papers, etc.	126	5 57 34 4	1. Excessive 2. Sufficient 3. Insufficient 4. Did not receive
f. Intelligence analyses specifically prepared to support the development of policy options or operational planning	126	2 47 42 9	1. Excessive 2. Sufficient 3. Insufficient 4. Did not receive

15. Rate the overall quality (as distinct from usefulness) of each of the following kinds of information.

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices
a. Nonintelligence analyses	121	3 56 28 5 7	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor 5. Did not receive
b. Raw intelligence reports	124	11 45 33 2 9	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor 5. Did not receive
c. Current intelligence	123	15 59 20 3 3	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor 5. Did not receive
d. Basic intelligence data	122	17 49 22 3 9	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor 5. Did not receive
e. Predictive and analytic intelligence studies	123	6 33 44 15 2	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor 5. Did not receive
f. Intelligence analyses directly related to policy options	123	7 30 32 20 11	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor 5. Did not receive

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices

16. Rate the usefulness of each of the following kinds of information.

a. Nonintelligence anlayses — 122

Percentage	Choices
18	1. Very useful
59	2. Fairly useful
15	3. Not particularly useful
1	4. Not useful at all
7	5. Did not receive

b. Raw intelligence reports — 126

Percentage	Choices
21	1. Very useful
48	2. Fairly useful
23	3. Not particularly useful
0	4. Not useful at all
7	5. Did not receive

c. Basic intelligence data — 123

Percentage	Choices
24	1. Very useful
57	2. Fairly useful
12	3. Not particularly useful
1	4. Not useful at all
7	5. Did not receive

d. Current intelligence reporting — 126

Percentage	Choices
36	1. Very useful
53	2. Fairly useful
8	3. Not particularly useful
1	4. Not useful at all
2	5. Did not receive

e. Predictive and analytic intelligence studies — 124

Percentage	Choices
25	1. Very useful
52	2. Fairly useful
19	3. Not particularly useful
1	4. Not useful at all
2	5. Did not receive

f. Intelligence analyses directly related to policy options. — 121

Percentage	Choices
33	1. Very useful
38	2. Fairly useful
14	3. Not particularly useful
4	4. Not useful at all
11	5. Did not receive

17. Of the time you have spent on foreign countries, indicate the importance in your work of each of the following areas. (see map)

a. Western Europe-NATO countries — 128

Percentage	Choices
68	1. Very important
27	2. Fairly important
5	3. Not very important

b. Soviet-European Communist countries — 127

Percentage	Choices
56	1. Very important
28	2. Fairly important
16	3. Not very important

c. Latin America — 128

Percentage	Choices
27	1. Very important
38	2. Fairly important
36	3. Not very important

d. Middle East-North Africa — 128

Percentage	Choices
59	1. Very important
24	2. Fairly important
16	3. Not very important

e. Sub-Saharan Africa — 127

Percentage	Choices
16	1. Very important
31	2. Fairly important
54	3. Not very important

f. Asia — 127

Percentage	Choices
50	1. Very important
36	2. Fairly important
13	3. Not very important

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices

18. Of the times you have spent on foreign topics, indicate the importance in your work of each of the following subjects.

a. Political	128	63 29 8	1. Very important 2. Fairly important 3. Not very important
b. Economic/Energy	128	62 27 11	1. Very important 2. Fairly important 3. Not very important
c. Military	129	61 17 23	1. Very important 2. Fairly important 3. Not very important
d. Scientific/Technological	126	34 38 28	1. Very important 2. Fairly important 3. Not very important
e. Biographic	128	14 50 36	1. Very important 2. Fairly important 3. Not very important
f. Other (specify)	9	88 11 0	1. Very important 2. Fairly important 3. Not very important

19. Characterize the quantity of the intelligence information you received on the following areas and subjects.

a. Western Europe-NATO countries	125	7 76 14 3	1. Excessive 2. Sufficient 3. Insufficient 4. Did not receive
b. Soviet-European Communist countries	125	6 72 17 5	1. Excessive 2. Sufficient 3. Insufficient 4. Did not receive
c. Latin America	123	3 50 29 18	1. Excessive 2. Sufficient 3. Insufficient 4. Did not receive
d. Middle East-North Africa	124	2 65 23 10	1. Excessive 2. Sufficient 3. Insufficient 4. Did not receive
e. Sub-Saharan Africa	119	3 50 19 28	1. Excessive 2. Sufficient 3. Insufficient 4. Did not receive

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices
f. Asia	120	2 73 18 7	1. Excessive 2. Sufficient 3. Insufficient 4. Did not receive
a. Political	114	9 72 16 3	1. Excessive 2. Sufficient 3. Insufficient 4. Did not receive
b. Economic/Energy	114	2 68 25 5	1. Excessive 2. Sufficient 3. Insufficient 4. Did not receive
c. Military	115	4 70 10 16	1. Excessive 2. Sufficient 3. Insufficient 4. Did not receive
d. Scientific and Technological	114	4 54 24 18	1. Excessive 2. Sufficient 3. Insufficient 4. Did not receive
e. Biographic	113	3 74 14 9	1. Excessive 2. Sufficient 3. Insufficient 4. Did not receive
f. Other (specify)	12	0 33 42 25	1. Excessive 2. Sufficient 3. Insufficient 4. Did not receive
20. Do you believe that you received all the available intelligence on the areas and subjects of interest to you?	126	50 50	a. Yes b. No (Please explain)
21. How often do you believe inteligence provided a unique input to your knowledge of the areas and subjects of interest to you (circle one)	128	5 57 34 4 1	a. Always b. Frequently c. Occasionally d. Rarely e. Never

22. Rate the <u>quality</u> and <u>usefulness</u> of the intelligence you received on each of the foreign areas with which you worked.

<u>Quality</u>

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices
a. Western Europe-NATO countries	112	17 67 15 1	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor
b. Soviet-European Communist countries	108	13 67 18 3	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices
c. Latin America	93	5 42 44 9	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor
d. Middle East-North Africa	105	11 52 30 8	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor
e. Sub-Saharan Africa	85	4 33 53 11	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor
f. Asia	108	6 63 29 3	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor

Usefulness

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices
a. Western Europe-NATO countries	111	22 66 12 1	1. Very useful 2. Fairly useful 3. Not particularly useful 4. Not useful at all
b. Soviet-European Communist countries	106	36 56 9 0	1. Very useful 2. Fairly useful 3. Not particularly useful 4. Not useful at all
c. Latin America	91	14 50 34 2	1. Very useful 2. Fairly useful 3. Not particularly useful 4. Not useful at all
d. Middle East-North Africa	103	24 64 11 1	1. Very useful 2. Fairly useful 3. Not particularly useful 4. Not useful at all
e. Sub-Saharan Africa	83	11 47 37 5	1. Very useful 2. Fairly useful 3. Not particularly useful 4. Not useful at all
f. Asia	106	20 64 16 0	1. Very useful 2. Fairly useful 3. Not particularly useful 4. Not useful at all

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices

23. Rate the <u>quality</u> and <u>usefulness</u> of the intelligence you received on each of the following subjects with which you worked.

<u>Quality</u>

	Respondents	Percentage	Choices
a. Political	114	8 66 25 2	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor
b. Economic/Energy	113	8 65 24 4	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor
c. Military	102	20 68 11 2	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor
d. Scientific and Technological	97	10 55 31 3	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor
e. Biographic	108	11 54 31 5	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor
f. Other (specify)	4	25 50 25 0	1. Excellent 2. Good 3. Fair 4. Poor

<u>Usefulness</u>

	Respondents	Percentage	Choices
a. Political	114	29 58 11 2	1. Very useful 2. Fairly useful 3. Not particularly useful 4. Not useful at all
b. Economic/Energy	113	27 60 12 2	1. Very useful 2. Fairly useful 3. Not particularly useful 4. Not useful at all
c. Military	102	41 47 10 2	1. Very useful 2. Fairly useful 3. Not particularly useful 4. Not useful at all
d. Scientific and Technological	96	28 55 16 1	1. Very useful 2. Fairly useful 3. Not particularly useful 4. Not useful at all
e. Biographic	107	22 56 17 5	1. Very useful 2. Fairly useful 3. Not particularly useful 4. Not useful at all

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices
f. Other (specify)	5	40	1. Very useful
		40	2. Fairly useful
		20	3. Not particularly useful
		0	4. Not useful at all
24. Did you ever operate without having requested intelligence when, in retrospect, you believe such support would have helped you?	131	60	a. Yes
		40	b. No
If Yes, please indicate for which areas and subject. (circle all that apply)			
a. Western Europe-NATO countries	77	39	
b. Soviet-European Communist countries	77	31	
c. Latin America	77	38	
d. Middle East-North Africa	77	48	
e. Sub-Saharan Africa	77	17	
f. Asia	77	38	
a. Political	76	54	
b. Economic/Energy	76	50	
c. Military	76	28	
d. Scientific and Technological	76	34	
e. Biographic	76	24	
f. Other (specify)	76	5	
25. Did you ever operate without intelligence information because you believed that the Intelligence Community could not properly satisfy your needs?	130	45	a. Yes
		55	b. No
If Yes, indicate for which areas and subjects. (circle all that apply)			
a. Western Europe-NATO countries	56	34	
b. Soviet-European Communist countries	56	30	
c. Latin America	56	21	
d. Middle East-North Africa	56	46	
e. Sub-Saharan Africa	56	14	
f. Asia	56	30	

Question	Respondents	Percentage	Choices
a. Political	54	41	
b. Economic/Energy	54	39	
c. Military	54	32	
d. Scientific and Technological	54	32	
e. Biographic	54	20	
f. Other (specify)	54	11	
26. Did you use intelligence information to support you in negotiations?	128	72 a. Yes 28 b. No	

Page Denied

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX C

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE SURVEYS

The first running of a survey of this magnitude invariably brings to light suggestions for methodological or procedural changes. Predictably, we have discovered that some things which were covered in this survey should have been handled quite differently, other things which were included possibly should not have been present at all, and still other things which were excluded should certainly have been included.

We believe it advisable to replicate this survey periodically. This would serve at least two important purposes. First, it would enable intelligence-producing agencies to see if problems which were identified during one administration are general and pervasive enough to carry over into other administrations. Second, and just as important, it would provide the intelligence-producing agencies with an empirical mechanism to gauge the effects of changes made in either the content or the delivery systems used for their products. Ideally, the responsibility for carrying out this type of survey should rest with a group of individuals who collectively:

> --are familiar with survey methodologies,

> --are in step with current data-analysis
>   techniques,

> --possess the computer power and software to
>   handle the data,

> --have no pre-conceived biases concerning the
>   outcome of such a study,

> --have authority to make methodological
>   decisions in the interest of maximizing the
>   objectivity of the study, and,

> --are thoroughly familiar with the
>   Intelligence Community.

The study group must work closely with a panel of senior representatives from each of the intelligence-producing agencies, so that the views and concerns of these agencies can be factored into the design and analysis of the survey instrument itself.

1
CONFIDENTIAL

The study group must agree on the exact charter, purposes, goals and objectives of the study, and also on the line authority for the study so that jurisdictional questions may be resolved without unnecessary debate. It is imperative that every member of the working group know exactly:

> --who requested the survey,
> --why it was requested,
> --what specific questions it should seek to answer,
> --who has responsibility for designing it and carrying it out,
> --where the final decision-making authority lies in the event of disagreement,
> --what form the final report should take,
> --for whom the final report will be written, and,
> --what other mechanisms might appropriately be employed for dissemination of the results.

The fact that these were not at all times clearly understood by every member of the working group during the current effort, occasionally made it difficult to progress smoothly through the various stages of the project.

In general, the methodology we adopted for this effort was a good choice and seems highly appropriate for future studies. That is, an "objective" instrument of carefully selected, structured items should be used in combination with essay items and follow-up interviews, to collect the basic data for the survey. Certainly, any future survey should attempt to collect data from as much of the entire population of policymakers as can be persuaded to participate in the effort. The issue of "sampling" the policymakers should, therefore, not surface at all.

Specific changes to be made in the items on the survey, or in the procedures and questions used in the interviews should come from members of the working group. Attention should be focused on any important conclusions that are suggested but cannot explicitly be supported by responses to particular items on the survey. Several conclusions have suggested themselves to the members of the current working group but cannot be reported as objective "findings" because no hard data dealing specifically with these areas was collected. The survey should be expanded to cover such topics and should be narrowed in areas that did not produce a distinct payoff insofar as the goals of the survey were concerned.

Finally, the interview phase of the study, while it produced data difficult to quantify, added immeasurably to our understanding of the real issues underlying the problems identified by the respondents in the questionnaire. Our recommendations would include a suggestion for expanding the

2

CONFIDENTIAL

topical scope of these interviews as well as the actual number of interviews held. With sufficient manpower, time and resources, it may even be feasible (and certainly would be desirable) to interview every willing survey participant.

CONFIDENTIAL